AST SpaceMobile Fell More Than 50%. A Director Just Made Her Biggest Buy Yet

AST SpaceMobile has lost more than half its value from its 52-week high. That alone does not make the stock interesting to me because a stock that has fallen 50% can still fall another 50%. What caught my attention was what happened near $57, where director Adriana Cisneros bought roughly $619,000 of (ASTS) at around $9 in 2021, $26 in 2024, and $51 in 2025. She has watched the company develop for years, seen the stock trade above $130, and has now chosen to commit more money at a higher price than before.

That is what makes this purchase particularly compelling to me. She is not averaging down from a bad entry. She is averaging up from much lower levels. Insider buying is often treated too simplistically, as though a director buying after a decline automatically means the stock is cheap. I do not think that way. I want to know what the buyer has already seen, what has changed since the previous purchase, and why they are prepared to pay more today than they were several years ago.

Cisneros has closely observed AST SpaceMobile as it has developed from an ambitious idea into an operating satellite network. She can still be wrong. Directors are not immune to optimism, execution mistakes, or bad timing. But someone who bought at $9, watched the stock run above $130, and then made her largest purchase at $57 is giving me a more compelling signal than someone simply trying to catch a falling knife.

The Stock Fell Faster Than the Opportunity

The question I keep coming back to is whether the business has deteriorated anywhere near as much as the stock has. AST SpaceMobile is trying to build a satellite network capable of connecting ordinary mobile phones directly from space. The company says it has partnerships with more than 60 mobile network operators covering well over 3 billion subscribers, roughly $1.3 billion of contracted revenue commitments, and BlueBird satellites 17 through 46 in various stages of production and assembly. Those numbers are meaningful, but they are not cash flow. A relationship is not revenue. A satellite in production is not a satellite that generates revenue. A backlog is only as valuable as the company's ability to convert it. That gap between potential and execution is why (ASTS) can move so violently.

At more than $130, investors were paying for a future in which AST SpaceMobile successfully deploys its constellation, converts telecom relationships into recurring revenue, and becomes an important part of the communications infrastructure connecting areas traditional towers cannot reach. At around half that price, a lot of optimism has been removed. What I am trying to work out is whether the opportunity has been removed with it. I do not think it has.

The strategic proposition remains unusually attractive. AST SpaceMobile does not require customers to buy a separate satellite phone. Its model is designed to work with ordinary smartphones through existing mobile operators. It already has agreements with AT&T and Verizon in the U.S., a European joint venture with Vodafone, and partnerships across multiple international markets. Orange is preparing direct-to-device demonstrations with the company in Romania, while TELUS has signed a commercial agreement for Canada and agreed to become a shareholder.

That is the part I think the market can overlook when the chart looks bad.

This Is Still an Execution Story

I have seen this many times over my career. A huge addressable market becomes the thesis, then the valuation starts reflecting the dream before the infrastructure exists to support it. When the stock falls, investors rediscover the capital intensity, timing risk, and dilution that were there all along.

With (ASTS), the work now is much simpler. Production has to stay on schedule, launches have to happen, and commercial agreements have to turn into recurring revenue. The company is targeting $150 million to $200 million of revenue for 2026 while continuing to scale the network, and those numbers matter far more to me than another presentation showing billions of potential users.

The funding side matters just as much. Building a satellite constellation consumes real capital long before the full economics appear. A great end market does not protect shareholders from a poor capital structure. If commercialization takes longer than expected and the company must repeatedly raise equity to bridge the gap, the technology can still be strategically valuable while the stock performs badly.

That is why I would avoid buying (ASTS) , as it is down more than 50% and because Cisneros did. The insider purchase gets the stock onto my desk. The execution decides whether it stays there.

That is also one of the ideas I return to in Price Catalysts. A lower price is not enough. Something must change expectations. Here the catalysts are visible: more satellites reaching orbit, beta services moving toward commercial deployment, operator agreements producing real revenue and evidence that the company can finance the buildout without constantly coming back to shareholders.

The Strategic Value Is Hard to Ignore

There is another angle I would not build the thesis around, but I would keep in the back of my mind. AST SpaceMobile is becoming strategically important to some of the largest telecom operators in the world. AT&T, Verizon, and Vodafone already have direct relationships with the company. Google and Rakuten have also been strategic investors, and the three largest U.S. mobile operators are now pursuing a joint venture around direct-to-device satellite connectivity. I am not suggesting a takeover is imminent. There is no evidence of that. But when a company owns difficult technology, scarce spectrum access, years of engineering work, and relationships with carriers representing billions of customers, I always ask what that asset could be worth to somebody who needs it. That question becomes more interesting after a 50% decline. The obvious potential buyers would also face complications. Founder Abel Avellan retains substantial voting control, and AST SpaceMobile's partner-first model gives it value precisely because multiple carriers can use the network rather than one operator owning it outright. So takeover optionality is just that: optionality.

I would not pay for it. But I would not ignore it either.

Why $57 Matters Now

The area around Cisneros's purchase gives me a useful reference point. It is not a magical support level, but we now know that a director with years of experience inside the company was prepared to make her largest purchase there. If (ASTS) pushed further into the future, the insider purchase becomes much less useful.

I would also watch what other insiders do. One director buying is more revealing, but several senior people independently buying after the same decline would be a different signal. Several senior people independently buying after the same decline would be a different signal. Insider clusters have always interested me because the odds increase that the people closest to the business are seeing something the market has not yet priced.

At The Edge, this scenario is exactly the type of setup we spend time on: a stock where the price has moved dramatically, the underlying business is still progressing, and there is a catalyst or ownership signal that may tell us whether the market has gone too far. For now, (ASTS) and commercialization efforts continue. A director who has bought successfully before has just made her largest purchase at the highest price she has ever paid. That does not prove the stock is cheap, and it certainly does not remove the execution risk.

But it tells me the decline is worth investigating rather than simply avoiding.

And if AST SpaceMobile proves that the network can move from satellites in production to satellites generating meaningful cash, investors may eventually look back at the fall from $130 to the $50s as a collapse in expectations rather than a collapse in the opportunity.